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He understands and explains well the originators from Cournot onward all the way to the most contemporary contributions. James W. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December. Close Drawer The clearest presentation of new results on existence of equilibria using lattice theory. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2009): Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition. Hamilton Professor, University of Florida, and Editor, Southern Economic Journal Xavier Vives provides a thorough and rigorous description of the theory of oligopoly pricing and its intellectual history. 2. If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. Preview PDF MPRA_paper_9220.pdf Download (156kB) | Preview Abstract This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets all the demand coming to it. 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